Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 10 | Issue 2

Article 3

2002

The Paradox of Judicial Bypass Proceedings
Jamin B. Raskin

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Raskin, Jamin B. "The Paradox of Judicial Bypass Proceedings." American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 10, no. 2
(2002): 281-285.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Raskin: The Paradox of Judicial Bypass Proceedings
RASKIN  4TH MACRO

3/24/02 8:17 PM

THE PARADOX OF JUDICIAL BYPASS
PROCEEDINGS
JAMIN B. RASKIN

*

As a judge conducting an abortion bypass hearing and trying to
follow in good faith the Casey Courts instructions,1 you very quickly
confront the paradox of the Courts decision. The law thrusts you
into the center of this most private existential crisis in the life of a
young woman presumably so you can use your wisdom to help her
choose, but you quickly realize that there is no point at which you can
legitimately deny the young woman an abortion unless it is medically
indicated. That is, except for reasons of her health or safety, there
will never be a logical point at which you can veto the abortion
decision unless you, the judge, happen to be ideologically opposed to
abortion and are determined to have your way over her will. This
would, of course, be the definition of tyranny.2
Here is why there is nothing really to decide. If the question is
simply whether the young woman wants to have an abortion,
obviously she does  that is what she is here for. So, then the judge
3
must ask whether she is mature enough to make her own decisions.
If she is, then she obviously must be granted the right to go ahead
with the procedure.
However, if she is deemed not sufficiently mature to make the
*

Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. This Essay is
based on remarks at the Founders Day Symposium entitled  Unburdening the Right
to Abortion: Caseys Undue Burden Standard on March 27, 2001. I wish to thank my
colleague Professor Ann Shalleck for her insightful comments.
1. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
If neither a parent nor a guardian provides consent, a court may authorize the
performance of an abortion upon a determination that the young woman is mature
and capable of giving informed consent and has in fact given her informed consent, or
that an abortion would be in her best interests.
Id. at 899.

2. MERRIAM-WEBSTERS C OLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1279 (10th ed. 1999) (defining
the term  tyranny to mean an  oppressive power exerted by government, or  a
rigorous condition imposed by some outside agency or force ).
3. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899.
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decision, then the judge must ask whether it is in her  best interests
4
to have an abortion or to have a child. Yet, how can a girl or young
woman be too immature to decide whether to have a baby, but
mature enough to go through pregnancy, give birth, and make a
thousand important decisions regarding how to nurture, raise and
educate the child (or children, in the case of twins or other
multiples)? It is impossible to believe that a girl too immature to
decide for herself whether to have a baby could also be responsible
enough to become an effective mother a few months later. Thus, it
would never be in the best interest of such an immature young person
seeking an abortion to be denied one and instead forced to go
through the complicated physical, emotional, and personal changes
imposed by pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood. I think that
even a pro-life judge would be hard-pressed to conscript the young
womans body and life in this way, but if one did, it would clearly be
an exercise in private ideological tyranny.
The only case in which a judge could logically and ethically
overrule an immature womans decision to seek an abortion would be
if that abortion, for whatever reason, were going to pose to her
substantial medical risks  risks greater than those associated with
childbirth  and she could not fully appreciate or weigh those risks in
the decision-making process. This is obviously an extraordinarily
rare, if not imaginary, kind of case, since it is well-known that, in
general, childbirth is far more complicated and risky to the woman
5
than are the vast majority of abortions. But assume, arguendo, that an
immature and upset teenager does not learn she is pregnant until the
end of the sixth month, or has just tried to deny and suppress the
whole thing until that point, and the physician now believes the
medical risks of the procedure in her case are much greater to her
than those associated with going forward with the pregnancy and
childbirth. In this situation, the judge really does take the place of
the parents and may theoretically act in the young womans best
interest to choose childbirth over abortion, even over her express
desires.
Again, this would be a most exceptional case. In all others, mature
girls seeking an abortion should be able to get one since it is
4. See id.
5.  Having an abortion, after all, will virtually always entail less medical risk to a
pregnant woman than will childbirth . . . . David Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family
Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1170 n.232 (2001) (citing
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78 (1976), which stated that an abortion
using saline-amniocentesis  is safer, with respect to maternal mortality, than . . .
continuation of the pregnancy until normal childbirth ).
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fundamentally their choice and no one has any right or reason to
interfere. Immature girls seeking an abortion should also be able to
get one since it too is fundamentally their choice  no one has any
right or reason to interfere, and the consequences of compelled
childbirth would obviously be disastrous for her, the child and
everyone else involved.
If I am right about this, the Casey standard is written in an
unnecessarily and dangerously broad way. The question for a judge
in the case of an immature girl seeking an abortion is not what would
be abstractly in her  best interests, but rather whether a desired
abortion is counter-indicated because bringing the pregnancy to term
is  medically necessary to protect her health or life. Any other
rationale for denying such a woman a sought-after abortion should be
deemed categorically an  undue burden, an impermissible
interference with her privacy right and the placement of a substantial
obstacle in the path of her abortion choice. The judges role really
should be occupied by a physician because the only place for
legitimate discretion in reviewing the young womans wishes is in
deciding a medical issue.
Intriguingly, if we concede that sometimes the state really might
have a valid constitutional interest in forcing an immature young
woman to give birth for medical reasons, then we must acknowledge
that the converse is true too. A state could require pregnant minors
to get parental consent before seeing a pregnancy through to
childbirth. If a girls parents refused on the grounds that an abortion
is in her best interests, she could be forced to go before a judge for a
judicial childbirth bypass hearing. There, the judge would determine
whether she is, in fact, mature enough to make the decision to
become a mother (or to become a mother again). If so, she would be
free to have the baby. If not, the judge would then consider what is
in her best interests. Now, I can very easily imagine a judge saying,
 Youre a tenth grader, you have no skills, no money, your boyfriend
has no way to help you, and you will be sacrificing your whole
education, life and career by having this baby. You shall have an
abortion. But as much as I suspect the judge would be right in his
or her assessment of such a situation, I could not stomach the result
that a judge would be forcing a young woman to have an abortion
just because of his own estimate of what makes life worth living and
meaningful. What if the girl has an instinctive sense that she will be a
great mother? What if she is forced to abort and then can never
conceive again? It simply seems totalitarian to allow the state to
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deprive people, even immature girls, of this fundamental and
6
defining life choice.
However, if the decision to have a child will present substantial
medical risks and the judge believes the immature girl cannot properly
weigh those risks, then again I believe this is indeed a case in which
the court could override her express wishes. It does not make me
completely comfortable, but I see the logic of denying immature
young women the right to have babies in the interests of their own
health and safety, but for no other reason. In any event, the
champions of the judicial bypass hearing should recognize that this is
the logical corollary of their own position.
If the presence of a substantial medical risk is the only valid reason
that the state would have to override a young womans decision to
have an abortion, most of the questions asked by judges in trying to
ascertain the petitioners  best interest are simply irrelevant. The
question of her relationship to the father of the potential child,
whether she has a boyfriend, how she gets along with her parents,
what her social life is like, what her favorite classes are, whether she
has ever used drugs or alcohol, and so on simply have nothing to do
with the only legitimate inquiry, which is: what are the relative
medical risks attendant to both the abortion procedure and
pregnancy and childbirth?
Indeed, I venture to say that these searching voyeuristic hearings
function primarily to generate titillation and vicarious thrills for the
adults involved and to humiliate and to shame the young woman.
The vast majority, if not all, of the petitioners will be allowed to get
their abortions because of the bypass paradox, but not before first
divulging the most intimate details of their lives to a judge or
magistrate in an open courtroom. The juvenile abortion
interrogation process essentially forces a young woman to wear a
judicial scarlet letter  A, signaling abortion. Thus, in the final
7
analysis, the balance struck in Casey by Justice OConnor nicely
mirrors the basic social consensus around abortion; ultimately
women will be able to exercise a whittled-down right to the
6. See Jed Rubenfield, The Right of Privacy, 102 H ARV. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989)
(arguing that laws which deprive women of the right to choose an abortion are
totalitarian in nature).
A few legal prohibitions, such as that of abortion, have such profound
affirmative consequences that their real effect is to direct a persons
existence along a very particular path and substantially shape the totality of
her life. Such laws, the author argues, are properly viewed as totalitarian in
nature.
Id.
7. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
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procedure, but they may have to pay the price of social shaming,
professional probing, and official harassment along the way. All
women under Casey must face the threat of hostile anti-abortion
regulations, but teenagers face the most stern censoriousness as they
are the most vulnerable and exposed group in the female population.
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